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Discovering "America": A Cross-Cultural Perspective
When 1 first came to the United States, 1 knew virtually nothing
about "America." 1 attribute my immigrant naivet~ to the peculiar
insularity of my upbringing. 1 was nurtured in the rhetoric of
denial. To begin with, 1 absorbed Canada's provincial attitudes
toward "The States" -- a provinciality deepened by the pressures of
geographical proximity and hardened by the facts of actual dependence.
Characteristically, this expressed itself through a mixture of
hostility and amnesia, as though we were living next door to an
invisible giant, whose invisibility could be interpreted as
non-existence. The interpretation was reflected in the virtual
absence of "America" throughout my education, from elementary and high
school, where U.S. history ended in 1776, to my fortuitous college
training at the adult extension of the Montreal YMCA, where a few
unavoidable U.S. authors were taught as part of a course on
Commonwealth literature. 1 learned certain hard facts, of course,
mainly pejorative, and 1 knew the landmarks from Wall Street to
Hollywood; but the symbology that connected them--the American dream
which elsewhere (1 later discovered) was an open secret, a mystery
accredited by the world--remained hidden from ~e, like the spirit in
the letter of the uninitiate's text.
A more important influence was the Yiddishist-Left Wing world of
my parents. 1 recall it as an outpost barricaded from the threat of
assimilation by radical politics and beIles lettres, an immigrant
enclave locked into a Romantic-Marxist utopianism long after its
disillusionment with Stalin, and fortified by the alleged spiritual
values of art in the face of what seemed permanent economic depression
and utter cultural estrangement. 1t was there, far more than at
school, that 1 learned the strategies of denial. Their object in this
case was Canada. 1 cannot recall a single reference to national
matters in serious conversation. Literary discussions ranged from
Sholom Aleichem to Kafka, with polemical excursions to Yiddish
contemporaries published in the local newspaper, Der Keneder Odler
("The Canadian Eagle," a mixed metaphor, carrying cross-cultural
ironies for me even then). Politics consisted in a conflict of
imaginary options for world-revolution, extending from Trotsky's lost
cause to the visionary boundaries of anarchism. 1t seems appropriate
that 1 should have graduated from high school not to college, but, for
several years, to a socialist kibbutz in what used to be called the
Arabian desert.
The harvest of these experiences was an abiding suspicion of
high rhetoric, especially as a blueprint of the future, and an
abiding fascination with the redemptive promises of language,
especially as a source of personal identity and social cohesion.
Still, nothing in my background had prepared me for my encounter with
a secular modern nation living in a dream. "1 hear America singing,"
writes Whitman, and concludes: "The united States are themselves the
greatest poem." So, too, Emerson: "America is a poem in our eyes." 1
3arrived at a similar conclusion, but from a different perspective and
to a different effect. My experience of the music of America (as I
came to think of it) was closer to the epiphany of otherness recorded
in Kafka's "Investigations of a Dog." The canine narrator of that
story teIls us that one day in his youth a group of seven dogs
appeared before hirn, suddenly, "out of some place of darkness," to the
accompaniment of "terrible" and ravishing sounds:
At that time I still knew hardly anything of the creative gift
with which the canine race alone is endowed ... for though music
had [alwaysl surrounded me ... my elders had [neverl drawn my
attention to it .... [AlII the more astonishing, then ...were
those seven musical artists to me. They did not speak, they did
not sing, they remained generally silent, almost determinedly
silent; but from the empty air they conjured music. Everything
was music, the lifting and setting of their feet, certain turns
of the head, their running and standing still, the positions they
took up in relation to one another, the symmetrical patterns
which they produced .... [M]y mind could attend to nothing but
this blast of music which seemed to come from all sides, from
the heights, from the deeps, from everywhere, surrounding the
listener, overwhelming hirn .... I longed to ... beg [the musicians]
to enlighten me, to ask them what they were doing •... [Their
music] was incomprehensible to me, and also quite definitely
beyond my capacities .... I rushed about, told my story, made
accusations and investigations .... I was resolved to pursue [the
problem] indefatigably until I solved it.
The pursuit unfolds as aseries of ingenious inferences, deductions,
4and explications extending to virtually every aspect of "dogdom," from
the higher laws of "universal dog nature" to the specialized issue of
"soaring dogs" (how do they "remain for the most part high up in the
air, apparently doing nothing but simply resting there?") and the
still-controversial "rules of science" for getting food: should you
bring it forth by "incantation" or "water the ground as much as you
can"? Or is it that "the earth draws one kind of food out of itself
and calls down another from the skies"?l Nothing, it seems, escapes
observation, except the presence of human beings.
Kafka's story is a great parable of interpretation as
mystification--facts marshalled endlessly to build up contexts whose
effect, if not intent, is to conceal or explain away. It is also a
great parable of the limitations of cultural critique limitations,
not just illusions, for in fact the story conveys a good deal about
the dog's world, in spite of the narrator's inability to transcend
it; or rather, as a function of his non-transcending condition. In
this double sense, negative and ambiguous, Kafka's "investigations"
apply directly to my own as an Americanist. The general parallels may
be drawn out through a Chinese box of skewed interpretive positions:
dog vis-a-vis human, Russian-Jewish immigrant vis-a-vis French
Canadian Montreal, Canada vis-a-vis The states, and eventually
"America," as I came to understand it, vis-a-vis the cultural norms
and structures it represents.
These are not precise symmetries;2 but they point to certain
common principles of exegesis. I begin with the negative
implications. (1) To interpret is not to make sense of a mystery out
there. It is to discover otherness as mystery (something
5"overwhelming," "incomprehensible"), and then to explain the mystery
as the wonders of an invisible world, arealm of meaningful
"silence," resonant with universals. (2) To investigate those wonders
is not to come to terms with the new or unexpected. It is to
domesticate the unknown by transferring the agency of meaning from the
mystery out there to realities we recognize, and so to invest the
familiar--ourselves, or our kind--with the powers of a higher reality
("universal laws," "the rules of science," the view of eternity). (3)
To establish the laws and rules of that higher reality is not to break
through the limitations we experience. It is to deny our conditions
of dependency by translating those limitations into meta-structures of
culture, history, and the mind (the canine principles of music). As
for motives, we may infer from Kafka's parable that they are either
self-defensive or self-aggrandizing, and that in either case
interpretation is a stategy for repressing the actual worlds around us
which expresses itself through yearnings for a world elsewhere.
We might call this the hermeneutics of transcendence. The
possibilities it offers for self-aggrandizement (repressing otherness
for purposes of control or incorporation) are not far to seek: one
need only think of the manifold uses of "he" for God and/or humanity.
But this is to interpret from the vantage point of dominance. From
the dog's subordinate point of view, or the scholar's, to magnify the
categories of our containment is to diminish our capacities for
understanding. This is repression in a familiar psycho-cultural
sense: interpretation as a strategy for concealing our subjection to
a master discourse. Again, the advantages are not far to seek--among
these, evading the facts of subordination in ways that allow for
ocompensatory modes of control--but the sense of reassurance this
brings comes at the expense of critical awareness.
A negative prospect, as I said, especially since it is Kafka's
donn~ that we have no choice but to interpret. However, it is
complemented in the parable by the enabling ambiguities of
limitation. As the title suggests, "Investigations of a Dog" points
not only to the dog's attempts to describe Kafka's world, but, at the
same time, to Kafka's attempts to describe dogdom. And the result, as
I interpret it, is not a double impasse. It is a model of
cross-cultural criticism. Its terms are reciprocity, as against
dichotomy: not canine or human, but the contingencies of both, as
revealed (in degree) through the re-cognition of limitation. We might
call this the hermeneutics of non-transcendence. It may be said to
reverse traditional comparativist methods by its emphasis on the
historicity of "archetypes" and "essences." Its aim is not to
harmonize "apparent" differences (in the manner of pluralist
consensus), but on the contrary to highlight conflicting appearances,
so as to explore the substantive differences they imply. This entails
the recognition of universals as culture-specific barriers to
understanding; it is grounded in the faith that barriers, so
specified, may become (within limits) avenues of discovery; and its
logic may be briefly stated. If dreams of transcendence are indices
to the traps of culture, then inquiry into the trapping process may
provide insight both into our own and into others' actual
non-transcending condition. Such insight is problematic, provisional,
and nourished by a frustrating sense of boundaries. It denies us
access to apocalypse, but it helps make our surrounding worlds
visible.
I would like to think that my own investigations as an
Americanist show the benefits of this approach. For purposes of
analysis, I review these thematically, rather than chronologically.
My subject is the discovery of an other America, in the double sense
of Kafka's parable: negatively, as cultural otherness, and
ambiguously, as a set of cultural secrets, the other America hidden
from view by interpretation. Emerson's American Scholar grows
concentrically toward transcendence, in an expanding circle from
nature to books to representative selfhood. My own unrepresentative
(not to say eccentric) experience may be described as aseries of
increasingly particularized border-crossings: first, into "America"
proper; then, into the interdisciplinary field of American Studies;
and finally, into the special area of American literary scholarship.
* * *
I crossed into The States with a Canadian's common-sense view of
the Americas: two continents, North and South, each of them a mosaic
of nations -- which is to say, a variety of European models of
civilization -- joined by the semi-tropical bush-countries of Central
America. How could I not see "America" as a cultural artifact? I
knew that that sort of definition applied to all national identities
-- except Canada, which by consensus was "a country without a
mythology."3 But if Canada was an exception that proved the rule,
"America" was its antithesis, the example par excellence of collective
8fantasy. Consider the claims of Puritan origins. By comparison,
myths of other national beginnings were plausible at least. The mists
of antiquity cover the claims of Siegfried and King Arthur and the
exiled Trojan heroes who sired Virgil's Rome. Scripture itself
authorizes Joshua's claims to Canaan. But we know that the Puritans
did not found the united States. In fact, we know that by 1690, sixty
years after the Great Migration and a century before Independence, not
even the colony of Massachusetts was Puritan. Nonetheless, the belief
in America's Puritan ur-fathers was evident everywhere three centuries
later, at every ritual occasion, from Thanksgiving Day to July Fourth,
throughout the literature, from Harriet Beecher Stowe to Thomas
Pynchon, and in every form of literature, including endless debates
about whether or not the Puritan legacy was a good thing, and academic
polemics against the predominance of early New England scholarship.
My study of Puritanism started out as an investigation of what
appeared to me a cultural secret. I expected to discover the creation
of anational past, the invention of a Puritan tradition commensurate
with the needs of a modern republic. Instead, as I traced the act of
creation back through the nineteenth into the eighteenth and
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seventeenth centuries, I found that its roots lay with the Puritans
after all. 4 The tradition had been made up, as suspected, but it was
built out of historical materials, selected for historical reasons.
The fantasy of Puritan origins had worked, culturally, because in part
the New England Puritans represented the movement toward modernity,
and the myth they invented to express this aspect of their venture had
in turn provided the culture with a useful, flexible, durable, and
compelling fantasy of American identity.
I mean "compelling" in a descriptive or ethnographic, not a
celebratory sense. My discovery pertained to the historicity of myth,
and the secret it yielded applied as weIl to my Canadian geography of
the New World: what I had considered to be my neutral, common-sense
view of the territory out there as an extension of various European
civilizations. To see "America" as myth was to historicize the
Canadian identity--i.e., to see in it the contours of another,
complementary mythe I refer to the dominant vision of Canada: a
"loose scattering of enclaves or outposts of culture and civilization"
(according to that national consensus), protected from a "hostile
bush-country" by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. 5 The Mountie is a
symbolic figure in this design, of course. But the design itself
represents a distinctive national fantasy, which I now saw as a
variation of the same myth of conquest that had shaped the growth of
the Uni ted states.
"Canada" was the colonial version of the myth, a story told by
invaders who claimed authority for conquest from abroad--from European
royalty and civilizations centered in England and France. 6 "America"
was the indigenous imperialist inversion. It relocated the seat of
empire from the Old World to the New; it reversed the very meaning of
"newness" from its colonial status of dependency to a declaration not
just of independence but of superiority (political, moral, even
spiritual); and in this new sense it sanctified the "empty continent"
as itself constituting the natural-divine patent for conquest.
Gradually, the imperial counterpart to the bush-country police became
the frontiersman, living in harmony with nature and yet the harbinger
of civilization, a paradox explicable by the fact that the frontier
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itself had been transformed from its colonial sense of "barrier" into
an imperial summons to expand.
The issue, then, was not a clash of opposites, Canadian facts
versus American fantasies. It was a juxtaposition of myths, colonial
vis-a-vis imperial, each of them a border-land of fantasy and fact.
The colonial version had issued in "Canada," a country with a
mythology elsewhere, systematically de-centered and characterized,
accordingly, by a rhetoric of absence: non-Indian, non-European,
non-American, non-mythological. The other, imperial issue was
"America." As I followed its changing terms of identity (Puritan
errand, national mission, manifest destiny, the dream), the windings
of language turned out to be the matter of history. "America," an act
of symbolic appropriation, came alive to me as the twin dynamics of
empire: on the one hand, a process of violence unparalleled
(proportionately) by even the Spanish Conquistadors, and sustained
into the twentieth century by a rhetoric of holy war against
everything un-Americani on the other hand, an unleashing of creative
energies -- enterprise, speculation, community-building, personal
initiative, industry, confidence, idealism, and hope -- unsurpassed by
any other modern nation.
It amounted to a demonstration from within of Walter Benjamin's
thesis about the dynamics between "barbarism" and "civilization."'
Benjamin was seeking to historicize art's claims to transcendence. My
cross-cultural view was geared to the dynamics themselves. What I
discovered in the interconnections between violence and
culture-formation was transcendence in action: "America," an
interpretation, through which the worlds out there had been
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triumphantly repressed, rhetorically and historically -- first, by the
myths of their inhabitants ("savage," "primitive") attended by the
facts of genocide; and then by symbols of the land ("virgin,"
"wilderness") attended by the creation of the United 5tates as
"America."
* * *
So what began as English graduate studies in the United 5tates
became instead a trail into the myth and symbol thickets of American
5tudies. I encountered in its foundational works a scholarly
achievement commensurate with the cultural creation of "America":
Perry Miller's intellectual construction of national origins out of
the esoteric writings of forty Protestant sectarians; F.O.
Matthiessen's aesthetic construction of anational literary tradition
out of the masterpieces of five self-declared "isolatoes"; Frederick
Jackson Turner's historical construction of the national character out
of a frontier West that largely excluded its native inhabitants, not
to speak of the nation's non-westering immigrants. In all of these
monumental works, as weIl as in their successors, an extraordinary
capacity to analyze intricacies of thought, emotion, and imagination
seemed bound up with an extraordinary unwillingness to extend analysis
beyond the intricacies themselves. The "America" they revealed
appeared out of nowhere -- "out of some place of darkness," or rather
a spirit of place,8 variously labelIed nature, the New England mind,
the Jeffersonian '76, pioneer democracy -- like the seven musical
performers in Kafka's story.
I registered the anomaly as a cultural secret of academia.
American Studies, as it had developed from the Forties through the
Cold War decades, seemed a method designed not to explore its subject,
somewhat as the dog's investigations, though conjured up by the music,
are deliberately, exclusively, and astonishedly focussed elsewhere --
on the wonders of canine artistry ("the lifting and setting of their
feet, certain turns of the head .•. the position they took up in
relation to one another, the symmetrical patterns which they
produced"). The analytic tools of American Studies consisted of the
same materials, the same patterns of thought and language, which
Americanists had set out to investigate. As in Kafka's story,
analysis was the celebration of a mystery.
Nonetheless, their work had a compelling range and force, which I
attributed to a daring act of transgression: the application of
aesthetic criticism to what by tradition belonged to the province of
cognitive criticism. I refer to the familiar distinction between art
and artifact, Kultur and culture, that reaches back through German
Romanticism to the theological separation of sacred from secular.
Theology, we know, had actually mandated separate methods of exegesis
for that purpose: one method for unveiling the meanings of the Bible,
proceeding from text to transcendent text, and from one
divinely-inspired (if perhaps anxiety-ridden) authority to the next;
and another, profane method, an empirical approach suitable to
ordinary books concerning the empirical truths of this world. The
modern literary equivalent for that dichotomy, based on the
sacralization of art, is the opposition between text and context. The
latter is the arena of cognitive criticism, since "context" designates
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the world pro-fana, the "background" areas surrounding the temples of
genius, a secondary reality illuminated by "secondary sourees."
Aesthetic criticism is designed to reveal the richness, the
complexity, and the (unfathomable) depths of the "primary text" in its
own "organic" terms. This so-called intrinsic method may draw on
matters of context --psychology, sociology, philosophy, science -- but
only insofar as they serve the ends of appreciation. It may even
reach outside of the strictly aesthetic to the realm of spirit (moral
truths, universal values) provided that what it finds there is
reincorporated, truth and beauty entwined, into the meta-contextual
pleasures of the text.
American Studies seemed to have developed through areverse
strategy of incorporation. It drew methodically on contextual matters
-- it a~tively elicited cognitive analyses (of the American "mind,"
"heart," and "character") -- but it required these to conform to the
principles of aesthetic appreciation. If "Ameria" was not literally a
poem in these scholars' eyes, it was a literary canon that embodied
the national promise. The Puritans had discovered "America" in the
Bible; Jacksonians discovered the Bible in the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution; American Studies added to this
Biblia Americana the national literary classics. It may even be said
to have concentrated upon them as the key to it all, somewhat as
Christian typologists had discovered the secrets of Holy Scripture,
Old and New, from Genesis to the End-Time, in stories of Christ. What
followed was aseries of investigations of the country's "exceptional"
nature that was as rich, as complex, and as interdisciplinary as
"America" itself -- a pluralist enterprise armed with the instruments
14
both of aesthetic and of cognitive analysis, all bent on the
appreciation of a unique cultural artifact. Aesthetic instruments had
a privileged place here because it was as art, by modern consensus,
that the spirit most fully revealed itself. But the instruments of
cognitive analysis were no less important. It was their task to
reconstitute history itself as "American"; and, as we might expect,
they did so most appreciatively when they repressed the adverse facts
of American history, or else, more effectively still, represented
these as a violation of the nation's promise and original intent.
The music which thus came, in Kafka's words, "from all sides,
from the heights, from the deep, from everywhere," sounded to me like
ideology. I sometimes thought of it as musak, and I recognized in its
strains a long series of scholarly ventures in culture-formation, the
nationalist project of modern literary history that had been baptized
over a century before in the trinitarian faith of Volksgeist,
World-Spirit, and the sanctity of art. One extreme application, or
distortion, of this genre was the aesthetics of fascism. Another
extreme was the humanist enterprise (mingling chauvinism, utopianism,
and social critique) of Georg Gottfried Gervinus, Francesco de
Sanctis, and Desir~ Nisard. American Studies stood at the latter
extreme, of course, and no doubt it was the humanist difference which
allowed me to appreciate the insight it embodied into the dynamics of
culture. Without quite articulating it as a principle of analysis,
American Studies taught by example, in practice, that rhetoric is not
a surface coating, "mere metaphor," upon the deep structures of the
real. It is substantially, fundamentally, what the real is, even (or
especially) when the rhetoric serves to repress and deny. The dog's
interpretations mask the rules of music, but they reveal the world he
inhabits. Among other things, culture is how people interpret and
what they believe.
A simple lesson, but it required time, observation, and
participation to absorb. My outsider's view of American Studies was
that its "America" was a context made text by Americanists. My
American experience persuaded me that the poem was in some important
sense an accurate representation of the way things worked. "America"
was more than a figment of the imagination, an imperial
wish-fulfillment dream brought to life in the assertion of nationhood.
It was a way of imagining that expressed the mechanisms through which
the made-up becomes the made-real. Like other modern nations,
"America" was an imagined community. It was also a process of
symbol-making through which the norms and values of a modern culture
were internalized, rationalized, spiritualized, and institutionalized
rendered the vehicle, as the American Way, both of conscience and
of consensus.
The music of "America" still sounded to me like ideology, but it
was ideology in a new key, requiring ablend of cognitive and
appreciative analysis. I turned, accordingly, to the more flexible,
non-pejorative definitions of the concept available in anthropology:
ideology as a web of ideas, practices, beliefs, and myths through
which a society, any society, coheres and perpetuates itself. I hoped
that ideological analysis, so conceived, would allow me both to
exploit the insights of American studies and to revise its outlook.
American Studies had set out the interactions between symbol and fact,
rhetoric and history, by synthesizing their different forms of
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discourse. Iwanted to separate those forms (and their functions) in
order to investigate the conditions of synthesis-making. To that end,
I hoped that ideological analysis would allow me to mediate between
the world and the word in such a way that the word, "America," might
be contexualized, recovered for purposes of cognitive criticism, while
the world of America might be apprehended in its fantastic textuality,
as the development of a triumphant rhetoric and vision.
Necessarily, this set me at odds with the dominant concepts of
ideology in the field. I thought of these as three models of the
hermeneutics of denial: (1) The consensus model, adopted by the
leading schools of literary and historical scholarship during the Cold
War decades. This denied that America had any ideology at all, since
ideology meant dogma, bigotry, and repression; whereas Americans were
open-minded, inclusive, and eclectic. (2) The official Marxist model,
imported into academia during the Depression, and revived in the
Sixties. This denied that ideology had any truth-value, since it was
by definition false consciousness, the camera obscura of the ruling
class. (3) The multi-cultural model, a medley of various indigenous
themes, from the melting pot to the patch-work quilt, melded together
or interlaced with various forms of neo-Marxism. This denied that
America had an ideology, on the grounds that there were so many
ideologies, all in flux: republicanism, agrarianism, free enterprise,
consumerism, liberalism, working-class consciousness, corporate
industrialism, and so on, to the point where it came to seem the other
side of consensual open-endedness.
Against that background my concept of ideology was intended to
insist on (1) the ideological context of common sense eclecticism; (2)
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the truth-value of ideology, as a key not to the cosmos but to
culture, which mediates our access to cosmic truth; and (3) the de
facta coherence of American culture, as for example in the ideological
symmetries underlying the models of multi-culturalism and consensus.
The symmetries seemed to me transparent in the relation I spoke of
between the world and the word: the changing, conflictual, and yet
continuously sustaining relation between the uni ted states--in all its
multifarious "realities" (pragmatic, agrarian, consumerist, etc.)--and
the abstract meanings of "America." Heterogeneity was not the
antithesis to those abstractions; it was a function of hegemony. The
open-ended inclusiveness of the united states was directly
proportionate to "America's" capacity to unify and exclude, and more
precisely to unify by exclusion. The culture seemed indefinite,
infinitely processual, because as "America" it closed everything else
out, as being either "01d World" and/or not-yet-America.
I am describing a broad symbolic strategy, but my concern here
lay with a specific academic enterprise. It seemed to me that the
process by which the uni ted states had become America was nowhere more
clearly displayed than in the bipolarities of American Studies: on
the one hand, a multi-culturalism (or experiential pluralism) that
rendered invisible the structures of national cohesion; on the other
hand, a consensual identity, "American," that by definition
transcended the "ideological limits" of class, region, generation, and
race. As this principle applied to American literary studies in
particular, the relation between text and context opened into what I
came to think of as a cultural symbology: a configuration or tangle
of patterns of expression, interpretation, and belief common to all
areas of soeiety, ineluding the aesthetie. So understood, "high
literature" was neither an imitation of reality nor a Platonie (or
Hegelian) ladder to a higher reality. It was a mediation between
both, whieh I thought of in terms of ideologieal mimesis: a
representation of the volatile relations between eoneeptual.,
imaginative, and soeial realities that was different from, often
opposed to, and yet fundamentally reeiproeal with the ways of the
world in whieh it emerged. I intended my eoneept of ideologieal
mimesis to eonvey not only literature's multi-valenee, but its
eapaeities (in degree, within limits) for autonomy. Nonetheless, I
again found myself at odds with the dominant models of analysis in the
field, in this ease the field of literary studies. I think here in
partieular of the New Critieism, whieh through the 5ixties and the
5eventies still reined in the area of textual analysis, and of
oppositional eritieism, whieh then as now eomprised the most
influential literary group in Ameriean 5tudies.
My objeetions to the New Crities antedated my diseovery of
"Ameriea." They thrived on the invisibility of eontext, somewhat as
Kafka's narrator's ingenuities depend on his disembodiment of the
musie; or as the mystery he marvels at of "soaring dogs," floating on
air, depends on the invisibility of whatever or whoever is holding
them up. My own reading had eonvineed me, on the eontrary, that
literary texts were deeply embedded in issues of eontext; that this
embeddedment was a eentral souree of ereative, moral, and intelleetual
vitality; and that to deny that souree of empowerment on prineiple, or
by professional reflex, was a form of aesthetie minimalism whieh
drained literature of its riehest meanings. It was also to instate
ce+tain cultural values under the cloak of invisibility, as embodying
the transcendent unities of the text. And finally, under the guise of
reverence, it was to evade the most challenging questions posed by the
trans-historical qualities of literature, which center on the relation
(not the dichotomy) between "trans" and "historical." Criticism may
aspire to judgments of eternity, but it takes place in history. The
very forms of canonization (as Kafka's parable reminds us) are
mediated by historical consciousness; we break through its limitations
only in degree, and only by recognizing that we live in history, even
if we live on literature.
But of course New Critics were ipso facto not Americanists. My
direct engagement was with the oppositional critics. That term is a
recent coinage, designating certain post-Marxist forms of cultural
praxis. But in American Studies it has a far broader import. I have
in mind the adversarial stance of Americanist literary critics from
the very inception of the field: the school of subversion (as it has
been called) that constitutes the mainstream tradition of American
Studies from Vernon Parrington and Lewis Mumford through Matthiessen
and Henry Nash Smith, and that has continued to provide many of its
most distinguished figures. The principles of oppositionalism, so
understood, center on an essentialist conflict between an always
oppressive society and an always liberating literature -- a
sacred-secular library of America set against the ideologies in
America of racism, imperialism, patriarchy, and capitalist
exploitation. My objection to this particular text-context dichotomy
was more complicated in application than that to the New critics, but
it was based on a similar premise. My reading of the classic American
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authors convinced me that they were imaginatively nourished by the
culture, even when they were politically opposed to it. Melville's
famous affirmation of the subversive imperative comes in an essay
extolling America's destiny; and a similar dynamic informs the
cultural work of Hawthorne and Emerson, as it also underlies the
multiple connections between Nay-saying and representative selfhood in
the adventures of George Harris, Ruth Hall, Huckleberry Finn, Frederic
Henry, the Invisible Man, Oedipa Maas, and Rutherford Calhoun. 9
In all cases, the complementarity of text and context revealed a
cultural symbology which not only tolerated but elicited resistance as
astapIe of social revitalization. This didnot mean that the
literature was not subversive in some sense. My disagreement with the
oppositionalists lay not in particular interpretations of texts, but'
in their overall tendency toward allegory. I saw this as a sort of
beatification of the subversive; as a denial against all historical
evidence (from every field of art) of the continuously enriching
reciprocity between dominant forms of art and forms of ideological
domination; as a transfer of the powers of appreciative criticism
(centered in the mystique of the text) to political agency; and as a
confusion, accordingly, of literary analysis with social action. It
was as though (in a mirror-inversion of Kafka's parable) to
deconstruct the musicians' patterns of performance--or to uncover
adversarial tendencies within the symmetries they enacted, or to
discover different groups of performers--were to threaten the entire
world of music, and potentially to undermine the moral and social
structures within which the musicians functioned.
This romance quest for the Subversive seemed to me to have its
roots in a venerable (though "dark" and often mystical) branch of
hermeneutics, the esoteric tradition that bridged gnosticism, kaballa,
and the Romantic vision of Satan as the secret hero of Paradise Lost.
And in turn that visionary fusion of politics and Art recalled the
radical aesthetics of my youth. Here again literature was invested
with the spiritual values of protest, and literary criticism, by
extension, raised almost to the status of revolutionary activity. But
the national emphasis in this case -- the focus, positive and
negative, on the Americanness of American literature -- called
attention to a cultural difference in the very concept of radicalism.
I refer to a broad tradition of political dissent inspired by the
figural "America." Its connection to literary oppositionalism, as
this unfolded from the Vietnam years through the Reagan Eighties, was
both theoretical and institutional. Briefly, the student rebels of
one period became the academic authorities of the other. The
continuities this transformation implies -- beyond, or rather within,
the profession of "generation gap," "rupture," and "politicization"
require me to return once more to my literal-metaphorical moment of
border-crossing, this time into the suprising radical America of the
Sixties.
* * *
It was not the radicalism that suprised Me. Quite the contrary:
I had exected to find the land of Sacco and Vanzetti an unincorporated
America of class contradictions, residual resistance, and emergent
struggle. And so it was. But the protest rendered invisible the
cultural limitations which these conflicts implied. The sources of
conflict persisted -- indeed, according to the protesters they had
deepened -- but they were described in terms that reinforced this
society's values and myths. The counter-culture swam into my view in
aseries of abstractions, two by two, like the procession of
leviathans at the start of Moby-Dick, as the gates of Ishmael's
wonder~world swing open: Freedom versus Tyranny, Opportunity versus
Oppression, progress versus Chaos; and mid-most of them all, like a
Janus-faced phantom in the air, "America," real and ideal. The real
faced toward doomsday. The ideal, facing the millennium, appeared
sometimes in the form of national representatives (Jefferson,
Lincoln), sometimes as representative texts (the Mayflower Compact,
the federal Constitution), sometimes incultural key words ("equal
rights," "self-realization"), or else in the appositional symbology of
pluralism ("heterogeneity," "nation of nations").
My common-sense response was co-optation. What else could this
Americanization of utopia be but some long-ripened generational rite
of passage, a ritual recycling of the energies of radical change into
the structures of continuity? In this culture, I concluded, the
conservatives were on the left; their characteristic strategy was to
displace radical alternatives with an indigenous tradition of reform.
Thus the alternative implicit in Nat Turner's revolt had been absorbed
into the exemplary American protest embodied in The Narrative of
Frederick Douglass; so, too in the long run, were the alternatives
offered by Paul Robeson and Malcolm X. The quintessentially liberal
programs for change that linked Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Gloria
Steinem encompassed, blurred, and eventually eliminated other feminist
alternatives (those which did not focus on "America"), from the Grimk~
sisters to Emma Goldman and Angela Davis. It was the cultural work of
Emerson and Emersonians, from (say) William James through Paul
Goodman, to obviate socialist or communist alternatives to capitalism.
This form of cultural work joined Jefferson to Thoreau and both to
Martin Luther King, in an omnivorous oppositionalism that ingested all
competing modes of radicalism--from the Fourierists to Herbert Marcuse
and Noam Chomsky--in the course of redefining injustice as
un-American, revolution as the legacy of '76, and inequities of class,
race, and gender as disparities between the theory and the practice of
Americanness.
These dissenters, it seemed clear, had miscalculated not just the
power but the nature of rhetoric. They had thought to appropriate
"America" as a trope of the spirit, and so to turn the national
symbol, now freed of its base historical content, into a vehicle of
moral and political renovation. In the event, however, the symbol had
refigured the moral and political terms of renovation -- had rendered
freedom, opportunity, democracy, and radicalism itself part of the
American way.10 But the results of their miscalculations, as I traced
these back through the nineteen hundreds, had unexpected consequences.
What I learned from that century-long lesson in co-optation altered my
views both of American protest and of the radical outlook I had
brought to it. The culture, I discovered, had indeed found ways of
harnessing revolution for its own purposes; but the ways themselves
were volatile, even (to a point) open-ended. They tended toward
subversion even as they drew such tendencies into persistent, deeply
conservative patterns of culture.
In short, the issue was not co-optation or dissent. It was
varieties of co-optation, varieties of dissent, and above all
varieties of co-optationjdissent. "America" was a symbolic field,
continually influenced by extrinsic sources, and sometimes changing
through those influences, but characteristically absorbing and
adapting them to its own distinctive patterns. And in the course of
adaptation, it was recurrently generating its own adversarial forms.
The "alternative Americas" it spawned were (like the originating
symbol) ideology and utopia combined. They opposed the system in ways
that reaffirmed its ideals; but the process of reaffirmation
constituted a radical tradition of a certain kind. Hence the
ambiguities that linked Douglass to King, Thoreau to Goodman, Stanton
to Steinem. In all these cases, dissent was demonstrably an appeal
to, and through, the rhetoric and values of the dominant culture; and
in every case, it issued in a fundamental challenge to the system:
racism subverted in the story of a self-made man; patriarchy subverted
through a revised version of the Declaration of Independence; the
authority of government subverted by a July Fourth experiment in
self-reliance.
The theory of co-optation assumes a basic dichotomy between
radicalism and reform, as though one could be for or against an entire
culture; as though not to be against a culture fundamentally (whatever
that means) was to be fundamentally part of it; and as though one
could hope to effect social change by advocating ideas or programs
that were alien to whatever held together the society at large--which
is to say, to its strategies of cohesion. The radicaljreformist
reciprocitieS I discovered pointed me in a different direction. They
called for a reconsideration of the entire structure of dichotomies by
which I had found American protest wanting. The European forms of
radicalism I had inherited were indeed opposed to that tradition, but
they, too, I recognized, were couched in a rhetoric that expressed
the cultures within which they had been generated. And they had given
rise to forms of social action that were ambiguously liberating and/or
restrictive, progressive and/or repressive, revolutionary and/or
reformist. The difference between the two traditions was not that of
empirical analysis versus symbolic projection, activism versus
aquiescence. It was an opposition between distinctive processes of
culture-formation, entailing (in each case) mixed forms of empirical
analysis and symbolic projection, and, as it happened, resulting in
major differences both in modes of social cohesion and in
prescriptions for social renovation. Insofar as this opposition,
too, was a false one -- insofar as (say) WaIden resists The Communist
Manifesto absolutely, denies altogether the theory of class identity
or the socialist state -- it is because each rests on a hermeneutics
of transcendence. Thoreau's appeal to self-reliance, like Karl Marx's
to class struggle, implies a chiliastic solution ("the only true
America," "the dictatorship of the proletariat"), built on apodictic
either-or's (individualism or conformity; revolution or oppression),
and, as in Kafka's parable, a wholesale transfer of agency, from
culture to the higher laws of nature, history, and the mind.
What did seem to me distinctive in degree about the American
instance was the cultural function of radicalism. It was a strategy
of pluralism everywhere to compartmentalize dissent so as to absorb
it, incrementally, unus inter pares, into a dominant liberal
discourse. But American liberalism privileged dissent. One reason
for the impact of the Puritans was their success in making a
dissenting faith the cornerstone of communitYi and the continuities
this suggests may be traced through the rhetoric of American
Revolution and the Emersonian re-vision of individualism as the
mandate both for permanent resistance and for American identity -- a
transcendental license to have your dissent and to make it too.
This was the context as well of oppositional criticism as I
encountered it in the late Sixtiesi and it remains the context of
American literary studies in our time of dissensus. 11 For although
dissensus involves the disintegration of traditional structures of
academic authority, nonetheless the conditions of dissensus do not
transcend ideology. On the contrary: they are a purer expression of
the liberal market-place than the genteel modes they superseded, which
offered at least a certain resistance to the pluralist incorporation
of academia. This is not to disparage the work of oppositional
critics, then and now. They have raised important issues, exposed the
constrictions of established theories and the injustice of established
practices, and properly called attention to the pressures of history
not only upon the literature we interpret but upon our categories of
interpretation. In these and similar ways they have been right to
call their criticism subversive. But subversive in what sense, and to
what ends, and for whom?
My misgiving first expressed itself in my sense of wonder at the
scope and intensity of their political claims. Particular questions
of interpretation apart, why were these Americanists so intent on
demonstrating the subversivenessof authors who for the most part had
either openly endorsed the American way, or else had lamented American
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corruption as the failure of New Eden? Or mutatis mutandis, why were
they so intent on asserting the regenerative powers of literary
studies (their own) that were not only inaccessible but unintelligible
to society at large? I recall thinking in this regard of two Thurber
cartoons, which might be considered examples by contrast of the
advantages of cross-cultural perspective. One of these shows a
copyist sitting before Rubens's "Rape of the Sabine Women" and
carefully reproducing the flowers in a corner of the scene. The other
cartoon shows a woman smiling like the Mona Lisa, while the perplexed
man on the couch next to her asks: "What do you want to be enigmatic
for Monica?" What did these oppositionalists want Emily Dickinson and
William Faulkner -- or more strangely still, their recondite readings
of Dickinson or Faulkner to be radical for?
For an "America," I believe, that rendered invisible the
interpreter's complicity in the culture. I do not mean complicity as
a synonym for moral (or even clerical) treason. One may be
complicitous simultaneously in various aspects of culture: those which
help people rationalize their greed, those which help naturalize
existing or emergent networks of power, and those·which open the way
to fundamental moral and social improvements. In this case, however,
complicity involved a strikingly uncritical stance (considering the
professional self-reflexity of these critics) toward precisely these
sorts of ambiguities. In allegorizing the powers of opposition -- and
in effect transcendentalizing the subversive -- these critics seemed
almost wilfully oblivious to their own cultural function. It was as
though their method had somehow recast oppositionalism itself in the
image of "America"j as though, to recall the terms of Kafka's parable,
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they had appropriated to their academic performances the radical
potential of the symbology they opposed. One general symptom is the
alliance between radicalism and upward mobility in the profession at
large -- the rites of academia encoded in writings of dissent. A more
telling symptom for my purposes is the cultural function of American
Studies. Surely, it is no accident that, of all academic specialties,
this field has been the most hospitable from the start to new waves of
immigration from the other America into the profession. Nor is it by
accident that, in spite of its very name, American Studies (as in
uni ted States) has gravitated toward a denial of cohesion; that this
rhetoric of denial has presented itself in protests against exclusion
(i.e., for integration); that the protest has taken the form of
hyphenated ethnicity Italian-American, Irish-American, and
Jewish-American hand in hand with African-American, Asian-American,
and Native American -- and that the result has been an adversarial
form of interpretation which roots subversion in institutions of
culture. It makes for a paradox that could obtain, in the old
immigrant myth, only in America: a school of subversion geared
towards the harmony of political activism and the good life, and
directed (under the aegis of American literary studies) towards a
fusion of personal, professional, and national identity.
I have found in this institutionalization of dissent still




Towards the end of Kafka's "Investigations of a Oog," the
narrator is granted a visionary consolation. As he lies alone, near
death, utterly exhausted by a long series of frustrations, suddenly,
he teIls us,
a beautiful creature ... stood before me .... My senses ... seemed
to see or to hear something about hirn [of which he hirnself was
unaware] .... I thought I saw that the hound was already singing
without knowing it, nay, more, that the melody, separated from
hirn, was floating in the air in accordance with its own laws,
and, as though he had no part in it, was moving toward me, toward
me alone.
I suppose that an analogy might be drawn to those ineffable moments of
wonder that light up the republic of American letters: Whitman's vision
of America singing, what turns out to be an epic "Song of Myself"; the
African slave Phyllis Wheatley's first sight of what she later learned
to call "the land of freedom's heaven-defended race"; the westward
caravan at the start of The Prairie, face to face with Natty Bumppo,
towering against the sunset; Mary Antin's Pisgah-view (from Ellis
Island) of the new promised land; the uncut forests of Long Island at
the end of The Great Gatsby, pandering in whispers to the last and
greatest of human dreams; Perry Miller's vocational epiphany at the
mouth of the Congo River, a calling (he reports) from the primal
darkness to tell the story of a brave New World; John Boyle O'Reilly's
immigrant vision, at Plymouth Rock, "Of light predestined" streaming
from "The Mayflower's ... chosen womb"; and before even those mythic
Puritans, the discoverer Columbus, as Emerson identifies hirn, and with
hirn, at the beginning of his career, in the opening pages of Nature:
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this beauty of Nature which is seen and feIt as beauty, is the
least part ....
The presence of a higher, namely, of the spiritual element is
essential to its perfection. The high and divine beauty which
can be loved without effeminacy, is that which is found in
combination with the human will. Beauty is the mark God sets
upon virtue .... When a noble act is done ... are not these heroes
entitled to add the beauty of the scene to the beauty of the
deed? When the bark of Columbus nears the shore of America;
before it, the beach lined with savages, fleeing out of their
huts of cane; the sea behind; and the purpIe mountains of the
Indian Archipelago around, can we separate the man from the
living picture? Does not the New World clothe his form with her
palm-groves and savannahs as fit drapery?13
I offer this emblem of discovery as an ultimum of the rhetoric of
transcendence -- an interpretation of origins and ends that
appropriates the mysteries of gender, nature, and the Oversoul to the
culturally transparent "I." And it is worth remarking that Emerson's
American Scholar fits weIl into its "living picture." He, too, stands
at the rhetoric~l "shore of America": a "New World" which he claims
by naming, as being his by visionary right, simultaneously his and
not-his, a hero's-trophy of beauty, virtue, savagery, and
representative selfhood. In the Scholar's case, as in Columbus's,
that triumph of Culture is perhaps the richest example in modern
history of the dialectic Benjamin speaks of between barbarism and
civilization. Even as it renders unto Caesar the things that are
Caesar's, "The American Scholar" renders them, transcendentally, unto
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God--raises the discoverer's veni-vidi-vici, as it were, into the
music of the spheres by investing his "noble act" with the "presence
of a higher, namely, of the spiritual element essential to its
perfection." Like Columbus, the American Scholar makes his
discoveries draped in nature's purpie: the "purpie mountains of the
Indian Archipelago" extending in his case to the Rockies of the
"continental" West. Toward him, too, and his hermeneutic "bark," the
"savages" hasten in wonder, "fleeing out of their huts of cane," as
once the Magi hastened from the East to witness the Nativity. Except
that in the later essay the object of discovery is an approaching
millennium--Incarnation and Revelation combined--and the savages are
no longer visible. In their place, Emerson paints for us an awakening
"our": "the sluggard intellect of this continent ... look[ingl from
under its iron lids" towards "the postponed expectation of the world
... a newage, as the star in the constellation Harp, which now flames
in our zenith, astronomers announce, shall one day be the pole-star
for a thousand years."14
My own "America" (if I may call it so) elicited a different sense
of wonder. Or to put this in its proper prosaic terms, it elicited a
critical method designed to illuminate the conflicts implicit in
border-crossing, and to draw out their unresolved complementarities.
I spoke of this method at the start as unrepresentative, thinking of
the corporate American figured in Emerson's Scholar. But the contrast
itself suggests another constituency: the other America hidden from
view by that interpretation; or as I put it, appropriatively, the
unincorporated country of Sacco and Vanzetti, a rhetorically United
States of nonetheless mainly unresolved borders--between class and
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race, ra ce and generation, generation and region, region and religion,
religious and national heritage--and a constantly shifting array of
cultural crossings, including those between Jewish-Canadian
marginality and Emersonian dissent.
The benefits of that method still seem pertinent to Me, perhaps
more now than ever, with the impending Americanization of what has
been called, imprecisely, our post-capitalist world. I began this
present investigation, after much hesitation about theme and focus,
directly after a lecture I attended by a visiting Russian economist,
Stanislav Shatalin. 1t was a dramatic occasion, since Shatalin was
directing the market-place transformation then underway in the USSR;
and it had an added personal edge (I fancied) for me alone, since he
happened to come from the same region from which my parents had
emigrated at about the time of his birth. "We have been wandering in
the wilderness for forty years," was Shatalin's summary of the
Communist experience; "the time of ideology is over, and the time for
truth has arrived" -- by which, he explained, he meant free
enterprise, individualism, and liberal democracy.15 As he proceeded
to outline his 500-day truth-plan, conjuring up transcendent things to
come, I found my thoughts turning gradually elsewhere -- drifting
back, as though in accordance with a law of their own, to the process
of my personal and professional discovery of New Canaan. I had had a
different border-crossing experience, and I had a different, because
cross-cultural, story to tell. My proper theme and focus, I realized,
was the music of America.
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arrived at a similar conclusion, but from a different perspective and
to a different effect. My experience of the music of "America" (as I
came to think of it) was closer to the epiphany of othern~ss recorded
in Kafka's "Investigations of a Dog." The canine that
story teIls us that one day in his youth a group of
appeared before him, suddenly, darkness," to the
accompaniment of "terrible" and ravishing sound :
At that time I still knew hardly anythi the creative gift
with which the canine race alone is though music
had [always] surrounded me ... my eId had [never] drawn my
attention to it .... [A]ll the e astonishing, then ...were
those seven musical They did not speak, they did
not sing, they remained gene lly silent, almost determinedly
silent; but from the air they conjured music. Everything
was music, the lifting a setting of their feet, certain turns
of the head, their run and standing still, the positions they
took upin relation one another, the symmetrical patterns
which they produce .... [M]y mind could attend to nothing but
this blast c which seemed to come from all sides, from
the deeps, from everywhere, surrounding the
helming him .... I longed to ... beg [the musicians]
to enlighte me, to ask them what they were doing .... [Their
music] was incomprehensible to me, and also quite definitely
beyond mYJ capacities .... I rushed about, told my story, made
accusat"ons and investigations .... I was resolved to pursue [the
] indefatigably until I solved it.
The pursuit unfolds as aseries of ingenious inferences, deductions,
and explications extending to virtually every aspect o;Lm," from
the higher laws of "universal dog nature" to the spec;-1alized issue of
/
"soaring dogs" (how do they "remain for the most pq-tt high up in the
I
/
air, apparently doing nothing but simply resting ~here?") and the
/
still-controversial "rules of science" for gettfng food: should you
i
bring it forth by "incantation" or "water the/ground as much as you
/
can," or is it that "the earth draws one kin~ of food out of itself
I
and calls down another from the skies,,?l ~othing, it seems, escapes
/
observation, except the presence of huma~!beings.
/
Kafka's story is a great parable of interpretation as
,/
,/
mystification--facts marshalled endle~~ly to build up contexts whose
!
l
effect, if not intent, is to conceal/or explain away. It is also a
/great parable of the limitations of cultural critique limitations,
/
not just illusions, for in fact ~he story conveys a good deal about
,/
the dog's world, in spite of ~e narrator's inability to transcend
it; or rather, as a function 9~ his non-transcending condition. In
,/
this double sense, negative ,Ind ambiguous, Kafka's "investigations"
I
I
apply directly to my own as/an Americanist. The general parallels may
/
be drawn out through a Ch~nese box of skewed interpretive positions:
Idog vis-A-vis human, Rus~ian-Jewish immigrant vis-A-vis French
/
Canadian Montreal, canafa vis-A-vis The States, and eventually
"America," as I came tp understand it, vis-A-vis the cultural norms
i
and structures it repjesents.
I
These are not ptecise symmetries;2 but they point to certain
I
common principles 0 exegesis. I begin with the negative
implications.
there. It is to
is not to make sense of a mystery out
otherness as mystery (something
J.O
discourse. Iwanted to separate those forms (and their functions) in
order to investigate the condi tions of synthesis-making .,' To that end,
I hoped that ideological analysis would allow me to mediate between
;
the world and the word in such a way that the word, !America," might
be contexualized, recovered for purposes of cogni t,lve cri ticism, while
the world of America might be apprehended in i ts ;/fantastic textuali ty,
as the development of a triumphant rhetoric an~/~ision.
,/
i
Necessarily, this set me at odds with thf dominant concepts of
/
iideology in the field. I thought of these as three models of the
/
hermeneutics of denial: (1) The consensus/model, adopted by the
I
leading schools of literary and historiCrl scholarship during the Cold
War decades. This denied that America lad any ideology at all, since
ideology meant dogma, bigotry, and re~ession; whereas Americans were
open-minded, inclusive, and eclectic! (2) The old-fashioned Marxist
/
model, imported into academia durins the Depression, and revived in
/
the Sixties. This denied that id~ology had any truth-value, since it
!
!
was by definition false consciou~hess, the camera obscura of the
/
ruling class. (3) The multi-cu~~ural model, a medley of various
i
indigenous themes, from the meVting pot to the patch-work quilt,
i
melded together or interlacedjwith various forms of neo-Marxism. This
I
denied that America had an i4eology, on the grounds that there were so
i
many ideologies, all in flu~: republicanism, agrarianism, free
i
enterprise, consumerism, liferalism, working-class consciousness,
corporate industrialism, so on, to the point where it came to seem
the other side of consens 1 open-endedness.
Against that backgro my concept of ideology was intended to
insist on (1) the ideologacal context of common sense eclecticism; (2)
Towards the end of Kafka's "Investigations of a Dog," t~e
/
narrator is granted a visionary consolation. As he lies ~ne, near
death, utterly exhausted by a long se ries of frustrati~, suddenly,
he teIls us, /1
/
a beautiful creature ... stood before me .... ~ senses seemed
to see or to hear something about him [of wh~ch he himself was
I
unaware] •... I thought I saw that the
without knowing it, nay, more, that the
him, was floating in the






I suppose that an analogy might be draw to those ineffable moments of
wonder that light up the republic of A erican letters: Whitman's
vision of America singing, what turns out to be an epic "Song of
Myself"; Phyllis Wheatley's first s· ht of "the land of freedom's
heaven-defended race"; the westwar caravan at the start of The
Prairie, face to face with Natty umppo, towering against the sunset;
Mary Antin's Pisgah-view (from
the uncut forests of Long Isla
lis Island) of the new promised land;
at the end of The Great Gatsby,
pandering in whispers to the ,ast and greatest of human dreams; Perry
Miller's vocational epiphanyiat the mouth of the Congo River, a
/
calling (he reports) from t~e primal darkness to tell the story of a
brave New World; John BOYl/o'ReillY'S immigrant vision, at plymouth
I
Rock, "Of light predestin~d" streaming from "The Mayflower's ...
I
chosen womb"; and before/even those mythic puritans, the discoverer
!
Columbus, as Emerson id~ntifies him, and with him, at the beginning of
,




combination with the human will.
jU






The presence of a higher, namely, of the spirit~l element is
,
essential to its perfection. The high and divine/6eauty which
.-
can be loved without effeminacy, is that which ~$ found in
;'
Beauty is the mark God sets
./
/upon virtue .... When a noble act is done ... iare not these heroes
/;
entitled to add the beauty of the scene to ~he beauty of the
/




before it, the beach lined with savages~/fleeing out of their
huts of cane; the sea behind; and the ~urple mountains of the
/
Indian Archipelago around, can we sep,~rate the man from the
living picture? Does not the New Wq/rld clothe his form with her
!
i 1 3palm-groves and savannahs as fit ~apery?
I offer this emblem of discoverY;bs an ultimum of the rhetoric of
transcendence -- an interpretation oi origins and ends that
appropriates the mysteries of gendej, nature, and the Oversoul to the
I
l
culturally transparent "I." And iJt is worth remarking that Emerson's
I
American Scholar fi ts weIl into ;/ts "living picture." He, too, stands
I
at the rhetorical "shore of Ametlica": a "New World" which he claims
!
I
by naming, as being his by visfonary right, simultaneously his and
/
i
not-his, a hero's-trophy of b~auty, virtue, barbarism, and
!
representative selfhood. In/the Scholar's case, as in Columbus's,
f
I
that triumph of Culture is ~erhaps the richest example in modern
f
history of the dialectic Benjamin speaks of between savagery and
/
civilization. Rendering u~to Caesar the things that are Caesar's,
I
"The American Scholar" als~ renders them unto God--raises Caesar's
\.
.H
veni-vidi-vici, as it were, into the music of the spherps by investing
,/'
it with the "presence of a higher, namely, of the sp~iitual element
/
I
essential to its perfection." Like Columbus, the MUerican Scholar
makes his discoveries draped in nature's purple: !the "purple
mountains of the Indian Archipelago" extendingi( in hi s case ) to the
Rockies of the "continental" West. Toward hi~, too, and his
hermeneutic "bark," the "savages" hasten in ~onder, "fleeing out of
their huts of cane," as once the Magi hast~ned from the East to
;
witness the Nativity. Except that in the!later essay the object of
i
discovery is an approaching millennium--incarnation and Revelation
.'
!
combined-~and the savages are no longe1visible. In their place,
Emerson paints for us an awakening "m./r": "the sluggard intellect of
this continent look[ing] from un~er its iron lids" towards "the
/
postponed expectation of the world f .. a newage as the star in the
constellation Harp, which now flam~s in our zenith, astronomers
i 1 4
announce, shall one day be the po1e-star for a thousand years."
My own "America" (if I mayjcall it so) elicited a different sense
,/
of wonder. Or to put this in jts proper prosaic terms, it elicited a
critical method designed to iAluminate the conflicts implicit in
,/
border-crossing, and to dra~ out their unresolved complementarities.
/I spoke of this method at ~he start as unrepresentative, thinking of
;
the corporate American fiqured in Emerson's Scholar. But the contrast
J
itself suggests another gonstituency: the other America hidden from
view by that interpretatAoni or as I put it, appropriatively, the
!
unincorporated.country ff Sacco and Vanzetti, a rhetorically United
States of nonethelessiainlY unresolved borders--between class and
race, race and genera ,ion, generation and region, region and religion,
/
Its proper theme and focus, I realized,
32
religious and national heritage--and a constantly shifti 9 array of
cultural crossings, including those between Jewish-Ca dian
marginality and Emersonian dissent.
The benefits of that method still seem perti ent to me, perhaps
more now than ever, with the impending American'zation of what has
been called, imprecisely, our post-capitalist world. I began this
present investigation, after much hesitatio about theme and focus,
directly after a lecture I attended by a isiting Russian economist,
Stanislav Shatalin. It was a dramatic ccasion, sinqe Shatalin was
directing the market-place transforma on then underway in the USSR;
and it had an added personal edge (I fancied) for me alone, since he
happened to come from the same reg'on from which my parents had
,I
emigrated at about the time of hYs birth. "We have been wandering in
/
the wilderness for forty years,! was Shatalin's summary of the
,I
Communist experience; "the tife of ideology is over, and the time for
truth has arrived" -- by whi~h, he explained, he meant free
.I
enterprise, individualism,/and liberal democracy.15 As he proceeded
/ .
to outline his 500-day tytith-plan, conjuring up transcendent things to
I
come, I found my thoug~ts turning gradually elsewhere -- drifting
/
back, as though in acifordance with a law of their own, to the process
/
of my personal and ptofessional discovery of New Canaan. I had had a
.I
different border-cr~ssing experience, and I had a different
J.//
cross-cultural t·.t.'y to tell.
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repressed master-dog metaphor, or
"musicians," and music.
2. Indeed, they imply aseries ofaxes of dominance, as in the
essay, together with certain correspo ding issues of cultural
essentialism and cultural relativis .
3. Douglas LePan, "The Country ithout a Mythology," in The Book of
Canadian Poetry, ed. A. J. M. p. 8.
4. What 1 found has sometim~s given me pause: Puritanism as a venture
in utopia; a group of radical idealists whose insulated immigrant
enclave was meant to prqvide a specimen of good things to come; a
J
I
latter-day Zion at the ~anguard of history, fired by avision that
I
I
fused nostalgia and proqress, prophecy and political action. The
analogies to the rhetoric of my own past seem so striking it still
